In 1989, petitioners' (collectively, Exxon) supertanker grounded on a reef off Alaska, spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The accident occurred after the tanker's captain, Joseph Hazelwood--who had a history of alcohol abuse and whose blood still had a high alcohol level 11 hours after the spill--inexplicably exited the bridge, leaving a tricky course correction to unlicensed subordinates. Exxon spent some $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts, pleaded guilty to criminal violations occasioning fines, settled a civil action by the United States and Alaska for at least $900 million, and paid another $303 million in voluntary payments to private parties. Other civil cases were consolidated into this one, brought against Exxon, Hazelwood, and others to recover economic losses suffered by respondents (hereinafter Baker), who depend on Prince William Sound for their livelihoods. At Phase I of the trial, the jury found Exxon and Hazelwood reckless (and thus potentially liable for punitive damages) under instructions providing that a corporation is responsible for the reckless acts of employees acting in a managerial capacity in the scope of their employment. In Phase II, the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to some of the plaintiffs; others had settled their compensatory claims for $22.6 million. In Phase III, the jury awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Phase I jury instruction on corporate liability and ultimately remitted the punitive damages award against Exxon to $2.5 billion.

Held:

1. Because the Court is equally divided on whether maritime law allows corporate liability for punitive damages based on the acts of managerial agents, it leaves the Ninth Circuit's opinion undisturbed in this respect. Of course, this disposition is not precedential on the derivative liability question. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 . Pp. 7-10.

2. The Clean Water Act's water pollution penalties, 33 U. S. C. sec.1321, do not preempt punitive-damages awards in maritime spill cases. Section 1321(b) protects "navigable waters ... , adjoining shorelines, ... [and] natural resources," subject to a saving clause reserving "obligations ... under any ... law for damages to any ... privately owned property resulting from [an oil] discharge," sec.1321(o). Exxon's admission that the CWA does not displace compensatory remedies for the consequences of water pollution, even those for economic harms, leaves the company with the untenable claim that the CWA somehow preempts punitive damages, but not compensatory damages, for economic loss. Nothing in the statute points to that result, and the Court has rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action, see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 . There is no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies, nor is it likely that punitive damages for private harms will have any frustrating effect on the CWA's remedial scheme. Pp. 10-15.

3. The punitive damages award against Exxon was excessive as a matter of maritime common law. In the circumstances of this case, the award should be limited to an amount equal to compensatory damages. Pp. 15-42.

(a) Although legal codes from ancient times through the Middle Ages called for multiple damages for certain especially harmful acts, modern Anglo-American punitive damages have their roots in 18th-century English law and became widely accepted in American courts by the mid-19th century. See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371. Pp. 16-17.

(b) The prevailing American rule limits punitive damages to cases of "enormity," Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371, in which a defendant's conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for others' rights, or even more deplorable behavior. The consensus today is that punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterring harmful conduct. Pp. 17-21.

(c) State regulation of punitive damages varies. A few States award them rarely, or not at all, and others permit them only when authorized by statute. Many States have imposed statutory limits on punitive awards, in the form of absolute monetary caps, a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or, frequently, some combination of the two. Pp. 21-23.

(d) American punitive damages have come under criticism in recent decades, but the most recent studies tend to undercut much of it. Although some studies show the dollar amounts of awards growing over time, even in real terms, most accounts show that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards remains less than 1:1. Nor do the data show a marked increase in the percentage of cases with punitive awards. The real problem is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts are concerned with fairness as consistency, and the available data suggest that the spread between high and low individual awards is unacceptable. The spread in state civil trials is great, and the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding compensatories. The distribution of judge-assessed awards is narrower, but still remarkable. These ranges might be acceptable if they resulted from efforts to reach a generally accepted optimal level of penalty and deterrence in cases involving a wide range of circumstances, but anecdotal evidence suggests that is not the case, see, e.g., Gore, supra, at 565, n. 8. Pp. 24-27.

(e) This Court's response to outlier punitive damages awards has thus far been confined by claims that state-court awards violated due process. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408 . In contrast, today's enquiry arises under federal maritime jurisdiction and requires review of a jury award at the level of judge-made federal common law that precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional standard. In this context, the unpredictability of high punitive awards is in tension with their punitive function because of the implication of unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries. A penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Holmes's "bad man" can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another. And a penalty scheme ought to threaten defendants with a fair probability of suffering in like degree for like damage. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 . Pp. 28-29.

(f) The Court considers three approaches, one verbal and two quantitative, to arrive at a standard for assessing maritime punitive damages. Pp. 29-42.

(i) The Court is skeptical that verbal formulations are the best insurance against unpredictable outlier punitive awards, in light of its experience with attempts to produce consistency in the analogous business of criminal sentencing. Pp. 29-32.

(ii) Thus, the Court looks to quantified limits. The option of setting a hard-dollar punitive cap, however, is rejected because there is no "standard" tort or contract injury, making it difficult to settle upon a particular dollar figure as appropriate across the board; and because a judicially selected dollar cap would carry the serious drawback that the issue might not return to the docket before there was a need to revisit the figure selected. Pp. 32-39.

(iii) The more promising alternative is to peg punitive awards to compensatory damages using a ratio or maximum multiple. This is the model in many States and in analogous federal statutes allowing multiple damages. The question is what ratio is most appropriate. An acceptable standard can be found in the studies showing the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards. Those studies reflect the judgments of juries and judges in thousands of cases as to what punitive awards were appropriate in circumstances reflecting the most down to the least blameworthy conduct, from malice and avarice to recklessness to gross negligence. The data in question put the median ratio for the entire gamut at less than 1:1, meaning that the compensatory award exceeds the punitive award in most cases. In a well-functioning system, awards at or below the median would roughly express jurors' sense of reasonable penalties in cases like this one that have no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness. Accordingly, the Court finds that a 1:1 ratio is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases. Pp. 39-42.

(iv) Applying this standard to the present case, the Court takes for granted the District Court's calculation of the total relevant compensatory damages at $507.5 million. A punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1 thus yields maximum punitive damages in that amount. P. 42.

472 F. 3d 600 and 490 F. 3d 1066, vacated and remanded.

Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, as to Parts I, II, and III. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Louisiana charged petitioner with the aggravated rape of his then-8-year-old stepdaughter. He was convicted and sentenced to death under a state statute authorizing capital punishment for the rape of a child under 12. The State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner's reliance on Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 , which barred the use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman but left open the question which, if any, other nonhomicide crimes can be punished by death consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Reasoning that children are a class in need of special protection, the state court held child rape to be unique in terms of the harm it inflicts upon the victim and society and concluded that, short of first-degree murder, there is no crime more deserving of death. The court acknowledged that petitioner would be the first person executed since the state law was amended to authorize the death penalty for child rape in 1995, and that Louisiana is in the minority of jurisdictions authorizing death for that crime. However, emphasizing that four more States had capitalized child rape since 1995 and at least eight others had authorized death for other nonhomicide crimes, as well as that, under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 , and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 , it is the direction of change rather than the numerical count that is significant, the court held petitioner's death sentence to be constitutional.

Held: The Eighth Amendment bars Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim's death. Pp. 8-36.

1. The Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 . The standard for extreme cruelty "itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 . Under the precept of justice that punishment is to be graduated and proportioned to the crime, informed by evolving standards, capital punishment must "be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of execution.' " Roper, supra, at 568. Applying this principle, the Court held in Roper and Atkins that the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment because the offender has a diminished personal responsibility for the crime. The Court also has found the death penalty disproportionate to the crime itself where the crime did not result, or was not intended to result, in the victim's death. See, e.g., Coker, supra; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 . In making its determination, the Court is guided by "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions." Roper, supra, at 563. Consensus is not dispositive, however. Whether the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime also depends on the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and on the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose. Pp. 8-10.

2. A review of the authorities informed by contemporary norms, including the history of the death penalty for this and other nonhomicide crimes, current state statutes and new enactments, and the number of executions since 1964, demonstrates a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape. Pp. 11-23.

(a) The Court follows the approach of cases in which objective indicia of consensus demonstrated an opinion against the death penalty for juveniles, see Roper, supra, mentally retarded offenders, see Atkins, supra, and vicarious felony murderers, see Enmund, supra. Thirty-seven jurisdictions--36 States plus the Federal Government--currently impose capital punishment, but only six States authorize it for child rape. In 45 jurisdictions, by contrast, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in Atkins and Roper and the 42 in Enmund that prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances those cases considered. Pp. 11-15.

(b) Respondent's argument that Coker's general discussion contrasting murder and rape, 433 U. S., at 598, has been interpreted too expansively, leading some States to conclude that Coker applies to child rape when in fact it does not, is unsound. Coker's holding was narrower than some of its language read in isolation indicates. The Coker plurality framed the question as whether, "with respect to rape of an adult woman," the death penalty is disproportionate punishment, id., at 592, and it repeated the phrase "adult woman" or "adult female" eight times in discussing the crime or the victim. The distinction between adult and child rape was not merely rhetorical; it was central to Coker's reasoning, including its analysis of legislative consensus. See, e.g., id., at 595-596. There is little evidence to support respondent's contention that state legislatures have understood Coker to state a broad rule that covers minor victims, and state courts have uniformly concluded that Coker did not address that crime. Accordingly, the small number of States that have enacted the death penalty for child rape is relevant to determining whether there is a consensus against capital punishment for the rape of a child. Pp. 15-20.

(c) A consistent direction of change in support of the death penalty for child rape might counterbalance an otherwise weak demonstration of consensus, see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U. S., at 315, but no showing of consistent change has been made here. That five States mayhave had pending legislation authorizing death for child rape is not dispositive because it is not this Court's practice, nor is it sound, to find contemporary norms based on legislation proposed but not yet enacted. Indeed, since the parties submitted their briefs, the legislation in at least two of the five States has failed. Further, evidence that, in the last 13 years, six new death penalty statutes have been enacted, three in the last two years, is not as significant as the data in Atkins, where 18 States between 1986 and 2001 had enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons. See id., at 314-315. Respondent argues that this case is like Roper because, there, only five States had shifted their positions between 1989 and 2005, one less State than here. See 543 U. S., at 565. But the Roper Court emphasized that the slow pace of abolition was counterbalanced by the total number of States that had recognized the impropriety of executing juvenile offenders. See id., at 566-567. Here, the fact that only six States have made child rape a capital offense is not an indication of a trend or change in direction comparable to the one in Roper. The evidence bears a closer resemblance to that in Enmund, where the Court found a national consensus against death for vicarious felony murder despite eight jurisdictions having authorized it. See458 U. S., at 789, 792. Pp. 20-22.

(d) Execution statistics also confirm that there is a social consensus against the death penalty for child rape. Nine States have permitted capital punishment for adult or child rape for some length of time between the Court's 1972 Furman decision and today; yet no individual has been executed for the rape of an adult or child since 1964, and no execution for any other nonhomicide offense has been conducted since 1963. Louisiana is the only State since 1964 that has sentenced an individual to death for child rape, and petitioner and another man so sentenced are the only individuals now on death row in the United States for nonhomicide offenses. Pp. 22-23.

3. Informed by its own precedents and its understanding of the Constitution and the rights it secures, the Court concludes, in its independent judgment, that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the crime of child rape. Pp. 23-35.

(a) The Court's own judgment should be brought to bear on the death penalty's acceptability under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Coker, supra, at 597. Rape's permanent and devastating impact on a child suggests moral grounds for questioning a rule barring capital punishment simply because the crime did not result in the victim's death, but it does not follow that death is a proportionate penalty for child rape. The constitutional prohibition against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments mandates that punishment "be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Trop, 356 U. S., at 99-100. Evolving standards of decency counsel the Court to be most hesitant before allowing extension of the death penalty, especially where no life was taken in the commission of the crime. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 597-598; Enmund, 458 U. S., at 797. Consistent with those evolving standards and the teachings of its precedents, the Court concludes that there is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individuals, even including child rape, on the other. The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, as here, but "in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public," they cannot compare to murder in their "severity and irrevocability," id, at 598.The Court finds significant the substantial number of executions that would be allowed for child rape under respondent's approach. Although narrowing aggravators might be used to ensure the death penalty's restrained application in this context, as they are in the context of capital murder, all such standards have the potential to result in some inconsistency of application. The Court, for example, has acknowledged that the requirement of general rules to ensure consistency of treatment, see, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 , and the insistence that capital sentencing be individualized, see, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 , have resulted in tension and imprecision. This approach might be sound with respect to capital murder but it should not be introduced into the justice system where death has not occurred. The Court has spent more than 32 years developing a foundational jurisprudence for capital murder to guide the States and juries in imposing the death penalty. Beginning the same process for crimes for which no one has been executed in more than 40 years would require experimentation in an area where a failed experiment would result in the execution of individuals undeserving of death. Pp. 24-30.

(b) The Court's decision is consistent with the justifications offered for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 . Among the factors for determining whether retribution is served, the Court must look to whether the death penalty balances the wrong to the victim in nonhomicide cases. Cf. Roper, supra, at 571. It is not at all evident that the child rape victim's hurt is lessened when the law permits the perpetrator's death, given that capital cases require a long-term commitment by those testifying for the prosecution. Society's desire to inflict death for child rape by enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for capital punishment forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of mature age to make that choice. There are also relevant systemic concerns in prosecuting child rape, including the documented problem of unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony, which creates a "special risk of wrongful execution" in some cases. Cf. Atkins, supra, at 321. As to deterrence, the evidence suggests that the death penalty may not result in more effective enforcement, but may add to the risk of nonreporting of child rape out of fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator, especially if he is a family member. And, by in effect making the punishment for child rape and murder equivalent, a State may remove a strong incentive for the rapist not to kill his victim. Pp. 30-35.

4. The concern that the Court's holding will effectively block further development of a consensus favoring the death penalty for child rape overlooks the principle that the Eighth Amendment is defined by "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," Trop, 356 U. S., at 101. Confirmed by the Court's repeated, consistent rulings, this principle requires that resort to capital punishment be restrained, limited in its instances of application, and reserved for the worst of crimes, those that, in the case of crimes against individuals, take the victim's life. P. 36.

957 So. 2d 757, reversed and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.

At petitioner Giles' murder trial, the court allowed prosecutors to introduce statements that the murder victim had made to a police officer responding to a domestic violence call. Giles was convicted. While his appeal was pending, this Court held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause gives defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses who give testimony against them, except in cases where an exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the founding. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 . The State Court of Appeal concluded that the Confrontation Clause permitted the trial court to admit into evidence the unconfronted testimony of the murder victim under a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. It concluded that Giles had forfeited his right to confront the victim's testimony because it found Giles had committed the murder for which he was on trial--an intentional criminal act that made the victim unavailable to testify. The State Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground.

Held: The California Supreme Court's theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing is not an exception to the Sixth Amendment's confrontation requirement because it was not an exception established at the founding. Pp. 3-20; 22-24.

(a) Common-law courts allowed the introduction of statements by an absent witness who was "detained" or "kept away" by "means or procurement" of the defendant. Cases and treatises indicate that this rule applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. Pp. 4-7.

(b) The manner in which this forfeiture rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant wrongfully caused the absence of a witness, but had not done so to prevent the witness from testifying, unconfronted testimony was excluded unless it fell within the separate common-law exception to the confrontation requirement for statements made by speakers who were both on the brink of death and aware that they were dying. Pp. 7-11.

(c) Not only was California's proposed exception to the confrontation right plainly not an "exceptio[n] established at the time of the founding," Crawford, supra, at 54; it is not established in American jurisprudence sincethe founding. No case before 1985 applied forfeiture to admit statements outside the context of conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying. The view that the exception applies only when the defendant intends to make a witness unavailable is also supported by modern authorities, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which "codifies the forfeiture doctrine," Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S 813, 833. Pp. 11-14.

(d) The dissent's contention that notestimony would come in at common law under a forfeiture theory unless it was confronted is not supported by the cases. In any event, if the dissent's theory were true, it would not support a broader forfeiture exception but would eliminate the forfeiture exception entirely. Previously confronted testimony by an unavailable witness is always admissible, wrongful procurement or not. See Crawford, supra, at 68. Pp. 15-20.

(e) Acts of domestic violence are often intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help. A defendant's prior abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to determining the intent of a defendant's subsequent act causing the witness's absence, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify. Here, the state courts did not consider Giles' intent, which they found irrelevant under their interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine. They are free to consider intent on remand. Pp. 23-24.

40 Cal. 4th 833, 152 P. 3d 433, vacated and remanded.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-D-2. Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to all but Part II-D-2. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed concurring opinions. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., joined.

Petitioner Plains Commerce Bank (Bank), a non-Indian bank, sold land it owned in fee simple on a tribal reservation to non-Indians. Respondents the Longs, an Indian couple who had been leasing the land with an option to purchase, claim the Bank discriminated against them by selling the parcel to nonmembers of the Tribe on terms more favorable than the Bank offered to sell it to them. The couple sued in Tribal Court, asserting, inter alia, discrimination, breach-of-contract, and bad-faith claims. Over the Bank's objection, the Tribal Court concluded that it had jurisdiction and proceeded to trial, where a jury ruled against the Bank on three claims, including the discrimination claim. The court awarded the Longs damages plus interest. In a supplemental judgment, the court also gave the Longs an option to purchase that portion of the fee land they still occupied, nullifying the Bank's sale of the land to non-Indians. After the Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed, the Bank filed suit in Federal District Court, contending that the tribal judgment was null and void because, as relevant here, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the Longs' discrimination claim. The District Court granted the Longs summary judgment, finding tribal court jurisdiction proper because the Bank's consensual relationship with the Longs and their company (also a respondent here) brought the Bank within the first category of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers outlined in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 . The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Tribe had authority to regulate the business conduct of persons voluntarily dealing with tribal members, including a nonmember's sale of fee land.

Held:

1. The Bank has Article III standing to pursue this challenge. Both with respect to damages and the option to purchase, the Bank was "injured in fact," see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 , by the Tribal Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. This Court is unpersuaded by the Longs' claim that the damages award was premised entirely on their breach-of-contract verdict, which the Bank has not challenged, rather than on their discrimination claim. Because the verdict form allowed the jury to make a damages award after finding liability as to any of the individual claims, the jury could have based its damages award, in whole or in part, on the discrimination finding. The Bank was also injured by the option to purchase. Only the Longs' discrimination claim sought deed to the land as relief. The fact that the remedial purchase option applied only to a portion of the total parcel does not eliminate the injury to the Bank, which had no obligation to sell any of the land to the Longs before the Tribal Court's judgment. That judgment effectively nullified a portion of the sale to a third party. These injuries can be remedied by a ruling that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction and that its judgment on the discrimination claim is null and void. Pp. 5-8.

2. The Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a discrimination claim concerning the non-Indian Bank's sale of its fee land. Pp. 8-24.

(a) The general rule that tribes do not possess authority over non-Indians who come within their borders, Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 564 , restricts tribal authority over nonmember activities taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember's activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U. S. 438 . Once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251 . Moreover, when the tribe or its members convey fee land to third parties, the tribe "loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands." South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679 . Thus, "the tribe has no authority itself ... to regulate the use of fee land." Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408 . Montana provides two exceptions under which tribes may exercise "civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands," 450 U. S., at 565: (1) "A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements," ibid.; and (2) a tribe may exercise "civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe," id., at 566. Neither exception authorizes tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction over the Longs' discrimination claim. Pp. 8-11.

(b) The Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction to hear that claim because the Tribe lacks the civil authority to regulate the Bank's sale of its fee land, and "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction," Strate, supra, at 453. Montana does not permit tribes to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land. Rather, it permits tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation that implicates the tribe's sovereign interests. 450 U. S., at 564-565. With only one exception, see Brendale, supra, this Court has never "upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land," Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353 . Nor has the Court found that Montana authorized a tribe to regulate the sale of such land. This makes good sense, given the limited nature of tribal sovereignty and the liberty interests of nonmembers. Tribal sovereign interests are confined to managing tribal land, see Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561, protecting tribal self-government, and controlling internal relations, see Montana, supra, at 564. Regulations approved under Montana all flow from these limited interests. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U. S. 676 . None of these interests justified tribal regulation of a nonmember's sale of fee land. The Tribe cannot justify regulation of the sale of non-Indian fee land by reference to its power to superintend tribal land because non-Indian fee parcels have ceased to be tribal land. Nor can regulation of fee land sales be justified by the Tribe's interest in protecting internal relations and self-government. Any direct harm sustained because of a fee land sale is sustained at the point the land passes from Indian to non-Indian hands. Resale, by itself, causes no additional damage. Regulating fee land sales also runs the risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory authority without their consent. Because the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribes and because nonmembers have no say in the laws and regulations governing tribal territory, tribal laws and regulations may be applied only to nonmembers who have consented to tribal authority, expressly or by action. Even then the regulation must stem from the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on entry, preserve self-government, or control internal relations. There is no reason the Bank should have anticipated that its general business dealings with the Longs would permit the Tribe to regulate the Bank's sale of land it owned in fee simple. The Longs' attempt to salvage their position by arguing that the discrimination claim should be read to challenge the Bank's whole course of commercial dealings with them is unavailing. Their breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims involve the Bank's general dealings; the discrimination claim does not. The discrimination claim is tied specifically to the fee land sale. And only the discrimination claim is before the Court. Pp. 11-22.

(c) Because the second Montana exception stems from the same sovereign interests giving rise to the first, it is also inapplicable here. The "conduct" covered by that exception must do more than injure a tribe; it must "imperil the subsistence" of the tribal community. Montana, 450 U. S., at 566. The land at issue has been owned by a non-Indian party for at least 50 years. Its resale to another non-Indian hardly "imperil[s] the subsistence or welfare of the tribe." Ibid. Pp. 22-23.

(d) Contrary to the Longs' argument, when the Bank sought the Tribal Court's aid in serving process on the Longs for the Bank's pending state-court eviction action, the Bank did not consent to tribal court jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. The Bank has consistently contended that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction. P. 23.

491 F. 3d 878, reversed.

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined.