After prevailing against the Government on a claim originating in the Department of Transportation's Board of Contract Appeals, petitioner (Richlin) filed an application with the Board for reimbursement of attorney's fees, expenses, and costs, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The Board concluded, inter alia, that Richlin was not entitled to recover paralegal fees at the rates at which it was billed by its law firm, holding that EAJA limited such recovery to the attorney's cost, which was lower than the billed rate. In affirming, the Federal Circuit concluded that the term "fees," for which EAJA authorizes recovery at "prevailing market rates," embraces only the fees of attorneys, experts, and agents.

Held: A prevailing party that satisfies EAJA's other requirements may recover its paralegal fees from the Government at prevailing market rates. Pp. 4-18.

(a) EAJA permits a prevailing party to recover "fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with" administrative proceedings, 5 U. S. C. sec.504(a)(1), including "the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project ... , and reasonable attorney or agent fees," and bases the amount of such fees on "prevailing market rates," sec.504(b)(1)(A). Because Richlin "incurred" "fees" for paralegal services in connection with its action before the Board, a straightforward reading of the statute demonstrates that Richlin was entitled to recover fees for the paralegal services it purchased at the market rate for such services. The Government's contrary reading--that expenditures for paralegal services are "other expenses" recoverable only at "reasonable cost"--is unpersuasive. Section 504(b)(1)(A) does not clearly distinguish between the rates at which "fees" and "other expenses" are reimbursed. Even if the statutory text supported the Government's dichotomy, it would hardly follow that amounts billed for paralegal services should be classified as "expenses" rather than as "fees." Paralegals are surely more analogous to attorneys, experts, and agents than to studies, analyses, reports, tests, and projects. Even if the Court agreed that EAJA limited paralegal fees to "reasonable cost," it would not follow that the cost should be measured from the perspective of the party's attorney rather than the client. By providing that an agency shall award a prevailing party "fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party" (emphasis added), sec.504(a)(1) leaves no doubt that Congress intended the "reasonable cost" of sec.504(b)(1)(A)'s items to be calculated from the litigant's perspective. It is unlikely that Congress, without even mentioning paralegals, intended to make an exception of them by calculating their cost from their employer's perspective. It seems more plausible that Congress intended all "fees and other expenses" to be recoverable at the litigant's "reasonable cost," subject to the proviso that "reasonable cost" would be deemed to be "prevailing market rates" when such rates could be determined. Pp. 4-8.

(b) To the extent that some ambiguity subsists in the statutory text, this Court need look no further to resolve it than Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274 , where the Court addressed a similar question with respect to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976--which provides that a court "may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs," 42 U. S. C. sec.1988--finding it "self-evident" that "attorney's fee" embraced the fees of paralegals as well as attorneys, 491 U. S., at 285. EAJA, like sec.1988, entitles certain parties to recover "reasonable attorney ... fees," sec.504(b)(1)(A), and makes no mention of the paralegals, "secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her client," 491 U. S., at 285. Thus, EAJA, like sec.1988, must be interpreted as using the term "attorney ... fees" to reach fees for paralegal services as well as compensation for the attorney's personal labor, making "self-evident" that Congress intended that term to embrace paralegal fees. Since sec.504 generally provides for recovery of attorney's fees at "prevailing market rates," it follows that paralegal fees must also be recoverable at those rates. The Government's contention that Jenkins found paralegal fees recoverable as "attorney's fee[s]" because sec.1988 authorized no other recoverable "expenses" finds no support in Jenkins itself, which turned not on extratextual policy goals, but on the "self-evident" proposition that "attorney's fee[s]" had historically included paralegal fees. Indeed, this Court rejected the Government's interpretation of Jenkins in West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 , concluding that a petitioner seeking expert witness fees under sec.1988 could not rely on Jenkins for the proposition that sec.1988's "broad remedial purposes" allowed recovery of fees not expressly authorized by statute. Pp. 8-11.

(c) Even assuming that some residual ambiguity in the statutory text justified resorting to extratextual authorities, the legislative history cited by the Government does not address the question presented and policy considerations actually counsel in favor of Richlin's interpretation. Pp. 11-18.

472 F. 3d 1370, reversed and remanded.

Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, in which Scalia, J., joined except as to Part III-A, and in which Thomas, J., joined except as to Parts II-B and III.

In an illegal lottery run by respondent Santos, runners took commissions from the bets they gathered, and some of the rest of the money was paid as salary to respondent Diaz and other collectors and to the winning gamblers. Based on these payments to runners, collectors, and winners, Santos was convicted of, inter alia, violating the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. sec.1956, which prohibits the use of the "proceeds" of criminal activities for various purposes, including engaging in, and conspiring to engage in, transactions intended to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity, sec.1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and sec.1956(h). Based on his receipt of salary, Diaz pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. On collateral review, the District Court ruled that, under intervening Circuit precedent interpreting the word "proceeds" in the federal money-laundering statute, sec.1956(a)(1)(A)(i) applies only to transactions involving criminal profits, not criminal receipts. Finding no evidence that the transactions on which respondents' money-laundering convictions were based involved lottery profits, the court vacated those convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

461 F. 3d 886, affirmed.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Parts I-III and V that the term "proceeds" in sec.1956(a)(1) means "profits," not "receipts." Pp. 3-14, 16-17.

(a) The rule of lenity dictates adoption of the "profits" reading. The statute nowhere defines "proceeds." An undefined term is generally given its ordinary meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179 . However, dictionaries and the Federal Criminal Code sometimes define "proceeds" to mean "receipts" and sometimes "profits." Moreover, the many provisions in the federal money-laundering statute that use the word "proceeds" make sense under either definition. The rule of lenity therefore requires the statute to be interpreted in favor of defendants, and the "profits" definition of "proceeds" is always more defendant-friendly than the "receipts" definition. Pp. 3-6.

(b) The Government's contention that the "profits" interpretation fails to give the money-laundering statute its intended scope begs the question; the Government's contention that the "profits" interpretation hinders effective enforcement of the law is exaggerated. Neither suffices to overcome the rule of lenity. Pp. 6-14.

(c) None of the transactions on which respondents' money-laundering convictions were based can fairly be characterized as involving the lottery's profits. Pp. 16-17.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Part IV that Justice Stevens' position that "proceeds" should be interpreted to mean profits for some predicate crimes, "receipts" for others, is contrary to this Court's precedents holding that judges cannot give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases, see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371 . Pp. 14-16.

Justice Stevens concluded that revenue a gambling business uses to pay essential operating expenses is not "proceeds" under 18 U. S. C. sec.1956. When, as here, Congress fails to define potentially ambiguous statutory terms, it effectively delegates the task to federal judges. See Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U. S. 89 . Because Congress could have required that "proceeds" have one meaning when referring to some of the specified unlawful activities listed in sec.1956(c)(7) and a different meaning when referring to others, judges filling statutory gaps may also do so, as long as they are conscientiously endeavoring to carry out Congress' intent. Section 1956's legislative history makes clear that "proceeds" includes gross revenues from the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving such sales, but sheds no light on how to identify the proceeds of an unlicensed stand-alone gambling venture. Furthermore, the consequences of applying a "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds" to respondents are so perverse that Congress could not have contemplated them: Allowing the Government to treat the mere payment of an illegal gambling business' operating expenses as a separate offense is in practical effect tantamount to double jeopardy, which is particularly unfair in this case because the penalties for money laundering are substantially more severe than those for the underlying offense of operating a gambling business. Accordingly, the rule of lenity may weigh in the determination, and in that respect the plurality's opinion is persuasive. Pp. 1-6.

Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part IV. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., joined.

Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered with animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard, petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to transport "funds from a place in the United States to ... a place outside the United States ... knowing that the ... funds ... represent the proceeds of ... unlawful activity and ... that such transportation ... is designed ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of " the money, in violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. sec.1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text petitioner's argument that the Government must prove that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, but held that his extensive efforts to prevent the funds' detection during transportation showed that he sought to conceal or disguise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control.

Held: Although sec.1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defendant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither can it be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed during transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction requires proof that the transportation's purpose--not merely its effect--was to conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds' nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 5-17.

(a) The statute contains no "appearance of legitimate wealth" requirement. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of "money laundering," this Court must be guided by a statute's words, not by its title's common meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206 . Here, Congress used broad language that captures more than classic money laundering: In addition to concealing or disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Congress also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or disguise the funds' location, ownership, or control. Nor does the Court find persuasive petitioner's attempt to infuse a money-laundering requirement into the listed attributes. Only the attribute "nature" is coextensive with the funds' illegitimate character, but that does not mean that Congress intended nature to swallow the other attributes. The Court is likewise skeptical of petitioner's argument that violating the statute's elements would necessarily have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate than they did before. It is not necessarily true that concealing or disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law enforcement's ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court disagrees with petitioner's argument that sec.1956(a)(2) must be aimed at something other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds because that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling statute, 31 U. S. C. sec.5332. Even if sec.1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no "appearance of legitimate wealth" requirement, the two statutes nonetheless target distinct conduct, in that sec.5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a defendant who, "with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement ... , knowingly conceals more than $10,000 ... and transports [it] from ... the United States to a place outside" the country. Pp. 6-9.

(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during transportation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining whether he knew that "such transportation," sec.1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally obtained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation of the funds within this country on the way to the border, but transportation "from a place in the United States to ... a place outside the United States," ibid.--here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore, what the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that taking the funds to Mexico was "designed," at least in part, to conceal or disguise their "nature," "location," "source," "ownership," or "control." The Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds during transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. This conclusion turns on sec.1956(a)(2)(B)(i)'s text, particularly the term "design," which the dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i.e., the transportation's intended aim. Congress wrote "knowing that such transportation is designed ... to conceal or disguise" a listed attribute, and when an act is "designed to" do something, the most natural reading is that it has that something as its purpose. Because the Fifth Circuit used "design" to refer not to the transportation's purpose but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of the term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning of "design" as structure or arrangement. It is implausible, however, that Congress intended this meaning. If it had, it could have expressed its intention simply by writing "knowing that such transportation conceals or disguises," rather than the more complex formulation "knowing that such transportation ... is designed ... to conceal or disguise." sec.1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Congress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law concepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant "structured" the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning of "design" is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.

In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with animal hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent the funds' detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even with the abundant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money in order to transport it, the Government's own expert testified that the transportation's purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders of the operation. Thus, the evidence suggested that the transportation's secretive aspects were employed to facilitate it, but not necessarily that secrecy was its purpose. Because petitioner's extensive efforts to conceal the funds en route to Mexico was the only evidence the Government introduced to prove that the transportation was "designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the [funds'] nature, ... location, ... source, ... ownership, or ... control," petitioner's conviction cannot stand. Pp. 10-17.

478 F. 3d 282, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined.