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SHERRY K.MILHOLLAND, M. Ed.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUMNER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; BENNY C. BILLS, Individually,
Defendants-Appellees.


No. 08-5568

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 07-00216—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Argued: April 28, 2009
Decided and Filed: July 2, 2009
Before: GUY, ROGERS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

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OPINION
_________________________

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Sherry Milholland appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on her Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim. Milholland has worked for the Sumner County Board of Education as a teacher and administrator for fourteen years. Milholland suffered from arthritis and alleged that the Board’s Director of Schools regarded her as disabled, and therefore transferred her from an administrative position to a classroom teaching position. The recently-enacted ADA Amendments Act of 2008 does not apply to this case. Under the prior version of the statute, the facts construed in the light most favorable to Milholland do not show a genuine issue for trial that the defendants regarded Milholland as disabled. The district court therefore properly ruled for the defendants.


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EDWARD JEROME HARBISON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GEORGE LITTLE, in his official capacity as Tennessee’s Commissioner of Correction, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.


No. 07-6225

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 06-01206—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Argued: January 20, 2009
Decided and Filed: July 2, 2009
Before: SILER, CLAY, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

SILER, Circuit Judge. Edward Jerome Harbison is a Tennessee prisoner under death sentence who has exhausted all appeals and was denied a writ of habeas corpus. In 2006, Harbison filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging Tennessee’s lethal injection protocol. The district court granted judgment in favor of Harbison, holding that the protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The state defendants (State) appealed, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), which was decided after the district court decision in this case. Baze upheld Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol and held that a substantially similar protocol would not violate the Eighth Amendment. Finding Tennessee’s protocol substantially similar, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.


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VAN DON NGUYEN,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.


No. 08-3579

On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A21 430 092.
Submitted: May 1, 2009
Decided and Filed: July 2, 2009
Before: MERRITT, GRIFFIN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

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OPINION
_________________________

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Van Don Nguyen, a permanent resident, petitions this Court for review of a final order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals on April 18, 2008. This appeal raises the issue of whether the unauthorized use of an automobile constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). At least two Circuits have rendered conflicting opinions on this question. Compare United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999) (based on Texas statute concerning unauthorized use of a vehicle) with United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (based on unlawful use of means of transportation under Arizona statute). The Board of Immigration Appeals followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit and found that Nguyen’s 1990 conviction for auto theft under California law was a “crime of violence” rendering him subject to removal.

. . .

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the theft of an automobile under the California grand theft statute is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The most succinct reason for our conclusion is that the statute in question regarding the “crime of violence,” as well as the California auto theft statute, is ambiguous and our decision must take into account the “rule of lenity.” Under the ancient rule of lenity, any doubt about this conclusion must be resolved in favor of the defendant, or in this case, the petitioner who is subject to deportation pursuant to an ambiguous criminal statute. See United States v. Santos, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008)(plurality); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971); United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying the “rule of lenity” to a previous conviction for a “walkaway” escape because it is not unambiguously a “crime of violence” and therefore cannot serve as the basis for career offender status). Justice Scalia recently explained in Santos that the rule of lenity prevents courts from having to “read the mind” of Congress and is a “venerable” requirement that the federal courts have applied for two centuries when interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes. When a criminal statute is ambiguous as to its intent, the “tie” goes to the defendant. Because we cannot find that auto theft is “unambiguously” a crime of violence under Section 16(b), we should follow the ancient rule and overrule the administrative agency in this case.