MERRITT, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Pedro Pacheco-Lopez (Lopez), challenges the district court’s denial of his request to suppress certain statements made prior to his arrest. The defendant argues that his initial statements – made prior to receiving his Miranda warnings – should have been suppressed because they were responses to a custodial interrogation and do not fall under the “booking exception” to Miranda. Additionally, the defendant argues that his later admission, made after receiving his warning, resulted from impermissible “Miranda-in-the-middle” questioning. Because the booking exception applies narrowly to biographical questions and has rarely been applied outside of a police station, we hold that the defendant’s first statements should have been suppressed. We similarly find that Lopez’s post-Miranda admission should be suppressed. Accordingly, the district court’s decision is REVERSED.

R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Approximately six months before he filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, David Scott Lee (“Lee” or “Debtor”) refinanced a residential mortgage loan with Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation (“Chase”), which was both the holder of the original mortgage and the refinanced mortgage. Seventy-seven days before Lee filed his bankruptcy case, and seventy-two days after Chase had distributed the funds that were used to discharge the original mortgage, a new mortgage on his residential real estate was recorded in favor of Chase to secure Lee’s obligation to repay the new loan. At issue in this appeal is whether Chase’s new mortgage lien may be avoided as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547. For the reasons below, we hold that the earmarking doctrine does not provide a refuge for late-perfecting secured creditors and thus does not shield Chase from preference exposure. We also reject Chase’s contention that perfection of its mortgage during the 90-day preference period did not result in diminution of Lee’s bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of the district court and reinstate the bankruptcy court’s judgment in favor of the Trustee.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Mark A. Brown, an Ohio death row inmate, appeals the decision of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A certificate of appealability (“COA”) was granted for one claim: whether clearly established Federal law was violated when the trial court gave an instruction during the penalty phase that allegedly coerced the jurors to agree to recommend a death sentence. We AFFIRM the district court’s decision to deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because neither the Howard charge nor the post-verdict polling of the jury was a violation of clearly established Federal law.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. This case presents an important issue at the intersection of immigration law and criminal law. Zia Ul Islam Rashid, a legal permanent resident, was twice convicted of misdemeanor marijuana possession in the state courts of Michigan, first in 2000 and again in 2005. He was subsequently charged by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Rashid conceded that he was removable because of his convictions for possessing a controlled substance, but he applied for cancellation of removal.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Rashid’s two state misdemeanor convictions combined to constitute an aggravated felony under federal law, thereby rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed. He now appeals to this court, arguing that both the IJ and the BIA erred as a matter of law in concluding that his two drug-possession offenses together qualify as an aggravated felony under federal law. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the BIA and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. State defendants seek mandamus relief from two discovery orders issued by the district court during the course of this class-action litigation. The district court issued the orders after a discovery dispute arose regarding defendants’ duty to preserve and produce electronically stored information relevant to the litigation. In the first order, the district court directed plaintiffs’ computer expert and a court-appointed monitor to inspect the state’s computer system and the computers of 50 key custodians to ascertain whether any relevant information has been impaired, compromised, or removed. The second order denies reconsideration of the first order and directs that the first order be executed forthwith. Both orders allow plaintiffs’ computer expert to make forensic copies of the hard drives of identified computers, including not only those at the work stations of the state’s key custodians, but also any privately owned computers on which the custodians may have performed or received work relating to the TennCare program. The orders also direct the U.S. Marshal, or his designated deputies, to accompany plaintiffs’ computer expert to ensure full execution of the orders. This court entered an emergency stay of implementation of the orders on December 7, 2007. For the reasons stated below, we now grant in part defendants’ petition for mandamus.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. In March of 2006, plaintiffs Mark Schafer and his two minor children filed a complaint against the City of Defiance Police Department (DPD), DPD officer John Williamson, unidentified DPD officers, and the Defiance County Department of Job and Family Services (DJFS) (collectively referred to as the defendants), alleging various civil rights violations, as well as unspecified violations of federal and state law. The district court eventually dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to prosecute, and the plaintiffs now appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. The court issued an initial opinion in this case on March 5, 2008. J&R Marketing, SEP, et al. v. General Motors Corp, et al., 519 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2008). The plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc based on three grounds. One of those grounds was that the panel failed to appreciate that statements made in GMAC’s 2003 10-K were incorporated in the plaintiffs’ offering documents because, while the 2003 10-K was filed later in time, the offering documents incorporated later-filed documents. Finding that, as the defendants concede, we must address this issue, we grant rehearing with respect to that issue and amend our initial opinion as follows. The judgment of the court as well as the rest of the opinion, however, remains unaffected.