KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Ms. Donna Anderson appeals her sentence imposed pursuant to her guilty plea for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). She alleges that her sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court incorrectly calculated her recommended Sentencing Guidelines range in at least three ways. First, she contends that the district court improperly used U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1), instead of § 2S1.1(a)(2), to determine her base offense level. Section 2S1.1(a)(1) calculates the base offense level based on the Guidelines section applicable to the underlying criminal conduct from which the laundered funds were derived. Subsection (a)(1) can only be used, however, when two conditions, which Ms. Anderson asserts are absent, are met, namely when the offender can be held responsible for the underlying offense and when the underlying offense’s Guidelines recommendation can be calculated. Even if subsection (a)(1) was the correct subsection to apply, however, Ms. Anderson asserts that the district court improperly withheld a two-level safety valve reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(7). Lastly, Ms. Anderson avers that if use of subsection (a)(1) was proper, then the two-level enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) was improper. The government concedes that the district court should have considered a two-level safety valve reduction, but otherwise opposes Ms. Anderson’s arguments. Additionally, the government contends that the district court improperly granted Ms. Anderson a four-level reduction for a mitigating role pursuant to § 3B1.2(a). The government also suggests that notwithstanding these errors, Ms. Anderson should not be resentenced because the totality of the errors was harmless to the defendant. Because we find that, while use of § 2S1.1(a)(1) was proper, Ms. Anderson should have been considered for a two-level safety valve reduction pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(7) and should not have been granted a four-level minor participant reduction pursuant to § 3B1.2(a), and that these errors were not harmless, we VACATE the district court’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Gregory Zaluski, William Coleman, Alex Reichman, Richard M. Price, Edward S. Price, Maria Cristina Jones, and Edward G. Nolte (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this class-action suit against United American Healthcare Corporation (“UAHC”), Osbie Howard, William Brooks, Tom Goss, Stephen Harris, Gregory H. Moses, Jr., and William E. Jackson (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to disclose that UAHC was making illegal payments to then-Tennessee Senator John Ford in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and Rule 10b-5, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Plaintiffs also brought claims against the individually named Defendants pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). The district court granted Defendants’ motion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The instant case presents this court with a particularly troubling example of a procedurally unreasonable sentence that also exceeds the statutory-maximum sentence. George Washington Penson, III (“Penson”) appeals his sentence and the judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. For the reasons explained below, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for resentencing.