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AMY BADEN-WINTERWOOD, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. LIFE TIME FITNESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 06-00099—Gregory L. Frost, District Judge.
Argued: October 22, 2008
Decided and Filed: May 19, 2009
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; COLE and COOK, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Amy Baden-Winterwood, et al., (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek overtime compensation from Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Life Time Fitness, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Life Time Fitness”) for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that because Life Time Fitness’s compensation plan (“corporate bonus-pay plan” or “compensation plan”) was not consistent with the salary-basis test set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.602, Plaintiffs were not exempt from overtime compensation. Defendant counters that its compensation plan was at all times compliant with the FLSA, or, in the alternative, that, if Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime compensation, such compensation is limited to that earned during the time period in which Defendant made actual deductions from Plaintiffs’ salaries.
On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court bifurcated the time period at issue, finding that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the salary-basis test in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (“Auer test” or “Auer subject-to-reduction test”), controlled for the time period before August 23, 2004, while 29 C.F.R. § 541.603 controlled for the time period between August 23, 2004 and March 3, 2006. Applying these tests, the district court concluded that certain Plaintiffs were entitled to overtime compensation but only for the three pay periods occurring in November and December, 2005, when actual deductions were taken from Plaintiffs’ pay.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s bifurcation determination as well as its finding that Plaintiffs were entitled to overtime compensation for only the three pay periods in which deductions were made. Life Time Fitness cross-appeals the district court’s determination that its compensation plans violated the FLSA and that Plaintiffs are entitled to any compensation.
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For the preceding reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the district court’s decision bifurcating the class period, finding that violations of 29 C.F.R. § 541.602 occurred in November and December of 2005, and limiting § 541.603 overtime compensation to those three pay periods. However, the Court REVERSES the district court insofar as it found that the pre-August 23, 2004 compensation plan did not create a substantial likelihood of deductions. The Court, therefore, concludes that Life Time Fitness is liable for overtime compensation to those Plaintiffs employed and subject to the corporate bonus-pay plan from January 1, 2004 to August 23, 2004. Finally, the Court REMANDS the issue of whether Plaintiff Tina Seals’s compensation met the salary-level test to the district court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
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OMARI MAZERA, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. VARSITY FORD MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 07-12970—Avern Cohn, District Judge.
Argued: April 27, 2009
Decided and Filed: May 19, 2009
Before: GUY, GILMAN, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Omari Mazera was fired from his job as a car porter at Varsity Ford Services, LLC. After filing a lawsuit against his former employer on the basis of race and disability discrimination, he moved the district court to declare that his prior written agreement to arbitrate this type of dispute was not enforceable. The district court denied the motion, holding that the arbitration agreement was binding on Mazera. But the court severed a cost-splitting provision in the agreement that required Mazera to pay up to $500 of the arbitration costs, holding that the provision would likely deter employees such as Mazera from enforcing their rights. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court insofar as it held that Mazera entered a binding agreement to arbitrate, but REVERSE the judgment regarding the severance of the cost-splitting provision and REMAND that issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.