ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. We granted en banc review to decide an important constitutional question: whether — and if so, under what conditions — a criminal defense attorney renders “deficient performance” under Strickland’s ineffectiveassistance- of-counsel rubric by failing to preserve a future-change-in-the-law argument in the hope that the Supreme Court will strike down the existing law while that defendant’s case is still pending on direct appeal.

But, because this particular defendant cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in any event, inasmuch as he cannot demonstrate the necessary prejudice, we find that we need not decide this broader constitutional question. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009) (citing “the older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable” (quotation and editorial marks omitted)); United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Courts should avoid unnecessary constitutional questions.”); Bowman v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 744 F.2d 1207, 1211 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e follow the longstanding practice of the Supreme Court . . . [in declining] to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Tower Realty v. City of East Detroit, 196 F.2d 710, 724 (6th Cir. 1952) (“It is the duty of federal courts to avoid the unnecessary decision of the constitutional questions.”).

This defendant’s only claim of prejudice is that he was denied the benefit of Booker’s change in the law; that is, he missed the opportunity to be re-sentenced under a post-Booker, advisory Guidelines scheme. But, as it turns out, the only way this defendant could have obtained the benefit of Booker’s change in the law was by petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, which he did not do; this prejudice is therefore the direct and sole consequence of the failure to petition for certiorari. Because defendants are not constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel in preparing petitions for certiorari, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974), this defendant cannot attribute this prejudice to any constitutionally deficient performance by his counsel. We must therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Creditor-Appellant Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. (“Vanderbilt”) appeals the order of the bankruptcy court, overruling Vanderbilt’s objection and confirming the reorganization plan proposed by Debtors Christopher C. Reinhardt and Tina M. Reinhardt. Under Debtors’ plan, Vanderbilt’s rights as a secured creditor were modified so as to reduce its secured claim on Debtors’ mobile home and real estate to the current estimated value of the properties. On appeal, Vanderbilt contends that the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., forbids the modification of Vanderbilt’s secured claim because it pertains to real property that is Debtors’ principal residence. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order.

This court entered an order on February 6, 2009, directing the appellant to show cause within twenty-one days why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). The appellant failed to respond.

The documents before this court reflect that the decision of the district court was entered on December 12, 2008. The time for filing a notice of appeal runs from entry of the judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Because no separate judgment was entered by the district court as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(1), the judgment is treated as filed 150 days after entry of the decision. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the notice of appeal was timely filed on January 14, 2009. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), and 26(a).

It is ordered that the show cause order is withdrawn.