BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Eagle-Picher Technologies, LLC1 (“EP Tech”), an electronics manufacturer, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2005. The United States, on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior, filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding against EP Tech under “CERCLA”—the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. Under CERCLA, the federal government may recover the cost of cleaning up hazardous waste from the parties responsible for its release.

Over the objections of U.S. Bank, the bankruptcy trustee, the bankruptcy court found EP Tech liable for $357,246 of already-incurred costs and $8,735,434 in estimated future costs for the clean-up of groundwater and soil contamination near a now-vacant manufacturing plant in Socorro, New Mexico. U.S. Bank appealed to the district court, which affirmed.

U.S. Bank appeals to this Court, arguing: (i) EP Tech is not liable under CERCLA for hazardous waste releases that occurred before EP Tech acquired an interest in the Socorro plant in 1998; (ii) even if EP Tech is liable for the clean-up costs at the plant, genuine issues of material fact precluded the bankruptcy court from concluding that EP Tech was responsible for contamination detected at a well located a mile and a half south of the plant; and (iii) the bankruptcy court improperly excluded evidence at the hearing on estimating the future cost of cleaning up the hazardous substances. The bankruptcy court’s decision was legally correct, and it did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of future costs. We AFFIRM.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Sha’rewa Bonner (“Bonner”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Corrections (“DOC”).1 Citing our decision in Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1990), the district court applied a one-year statute of limitations to Bonner’s claim and concluded that the claim was filed outside the limitations period. Bonner’s sole contention on appeal is that Collard was wrongly decided, and thus that we should overrule the decision. Because we do not have the power to overrule an earlier published Sixth Circuit decision under the instant circumstances, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This is a diversity action for injunctive relief seeking the return of confidential trade information generated and provided by SunCoke Co. of Knoxville,Tennessee to the defendant, MAN Ferrostaal, a German engineering and construction company. Relying on the Tennessee long-arm statute, SunCoke brought suit in federal court in Knoxville, where its principal place of business is located. The District Court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. It held that the activities of the German corporation did not create a sufficiently “substantial connection with the forum state,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985), to meet the due process standard of “fair play and substantial justice,” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1982). This broad constitutional standard requires us to consider all of the facts concerning the business relationship at issue to determine whether the exercise of federal jurisdiction is reasonable under the circumstances. We believe that the defendant’s dealings with SunCoke in Tennessee were substantial enough to meet the due process standard, and hence we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.