KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Officer Samuel E. Causey and the City of Crossville, Tennessee (“defendants”) appeal the decision of the district court denying them qualified immunity and therefore denying them summary judgment. Mr. Ben Davenport, the father of Austin and Kendra Davenport (“plaintiffs”), was shot by Officer Causey during an attempted arrest following a routine traffic stop. Plaintiffs sued,1 claiming that Officer Causey had used excessive force, and that the City of Crossville inadequately trained its officers on the constitutional use of force. Both defendants moved for summary judgment based on the qualified immunity of Officer Causey. The district court denied their motions, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact. Upon our review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude that the force used was constitutionally reasonable and, therefore, that plaintiffs have failed to establish a constitutional violation. We accordingly reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

OBERDORFER, District Judge. Defendants appeal the district court’s partial denial of their motion to dismiss Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought against them by representatives and relatives of Nathaniel Jones, a 350-pound 41-year old African American who died after Cincinnati police officers subdued and placed him under arrest. Because the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint, we affirm.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an order dismissing retirees’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty against their former employer and its employment benefit plan. Plaintiff retirees allege they were misled into prematurely accepting early retirement. The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs contend the district court failed to construe the complaint liberally in their favor and misapplied the governing statute of limitations. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. In April of 2003, Joseph Jeross and Kathleen Docherty pled guilty to, and were later sentenced for, their roles in a Detroit-based conspiracy to possess and distribute at least 100,000 Ecstacy pills. Jeross was sentenced to 270 months in prison and Docherty was sentenced to 188 months in prison. Their sentences were later vacated and remanded by this court following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On remand, the district court imposed the same sentences, which Jeross and Docherty now challenge on numerous grounds.

Both Jeross and Docherty argue that the district court used an incorrect version of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), improperly extrapolated the total weight of the 100,000 Ecstacy pills from the actual weight of a smaller number of pills actually recovered in the investigation, and denied them the opportunity to personally address the court at their resentencing hearings. Jeross separately contends that the district court sentenced him above the statutory maximum term in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), failed to apply a three-level reduction to his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility, and did not inquire at his resentencing hearing into whether he and his attorney had had the opportunity to review and discuss his Presentence Report (PSR). He also asks that we reassign his case to a different district court judge upon further remand. Docherty, for her part, argues that the district court erred in holding her responsible for 100,000 pills of Ecstacy and in increasing her base offense level on the ground that she was a manager in the conspiracy. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the sentences of both Jeross and Docherty.