COOK, Circuit Judge. David and Melody Smith filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Judy Williams-Ash—a social worker employed by the Hamilton County Department of Jobs and Family Services (“Children’s Services”)—claiming violation of their due process right to a hearing before the temporary removal of their children from their home. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Williams-Ash, holding that the Smiths were not entitled to a hearing because they consented to the removal of their children pursuant to a voluntary “safety plan.” We agree and affirm.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. William David West challenges the validity of two search warrants issued by two state court judges. He argues that the affidavits in support of both search warrants did not support a finding of probable cause. He also argues that the Leon good-faith exception does not apply to rescue the faulty warrants, and that all evidence obtained from these searches should have been excluded. The district court denied West’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrants. We find that neither search warrant was supported by affidavits establishing probable cause and the Leon good-faith exception does not apply. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order denying West’s motion to suppress, VACATE the ensuing judgment of conviction, and REMAND for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. On June 27, 2001, a jury in Hamilton County, Ohio, convicted Matthew Gray of aggravated murder and kidnapping, both with firearm specifications. After exhausting his remedies in state court, Gray filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process, to be present at his trial, and to confront the witnesses against him, when it removed him from the courtroom without warning him of the consequences of his actions. Because we conclude that the Ohio appellate court unreasonably applied Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), and because the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the outcome of Gray’s kidnapping conviction, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and GRANT a conditional writ of habeas corpus with respect to that conviction. However, because the record supports Gray’s aggravated murder conviction irrespective of the constitutional error, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Gray’s habeas petition with respect to the aggravated murder conviction.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, Rosalyn Grace, appeals the district court’s order of summary judgment resulting in the dismissal of her Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and federal and state gender discrimination claims against defendants USCAR and Bartech Technical Services, LLC (Bartech). First, she argues that Bartech and USCAR are joint employers and thus both liable for violations of her rights under the FMLA. In support of this argument, she contends that the district court misinterpreted existing case law regarding successor-in-interest liability under the FMLA and that she was eligible for unpaid medical leave. Second, she contends that the district court erred by granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on her Title VII gender discrimination claim. Specifically, Grace argues that Bartech had sufficient notice of USCAR’s violations to be held liable as a joint employer. And finally, the plaintiff argues that her related state-law claims should have been dismissed without prejudice, instead of with prejudice.

We hold that Bartech and USCAR are joint employers for FMLA purposes and that Grace was eligible for unpaid leave. Grace has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants violated her rights under the FMLA; consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed as to the plaintiff’s FMLA claims. We agree, however, with the district court that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of her gender discrimination claims under Title VII. Finally, the plaintiff is mistaken in stating that her state-law gender discrimination claim was dismissed with prejudice; it was not.