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BONNIE SULLIVAN; JOHN SULLIVAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OREGON FORD, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.
No. 07-01877—James G. Carr, Chief District Judge.
Argued: March 6, 2009
Decided and Filed: March 12, 2009
Before: KENNEDY, MARTIN, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Bonnie and John Sullivan (the “Sullivans”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant- Appellee Oregon Ford, Inc., d/b/a Mathews Ford Oregon (“Mathews Ford”) on their claims for damages arising out of a slip-and-fall incident at Mathews Ford on June 27, 2005. The Sullivans allege that Mathews Ford breached its duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Mathews Ford moved for and the district court granted summary judgment because the Sullivans failed to show that Mathews Ford was responsible for the alleged hazard and failed to produce evidence that the hazard existed for a sufficient length of time to provide constructive notice. See Sullivan v. Oregon Ford, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08-5307, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3443, at *14 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 2009) (citing Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 893 (6th Cir. 2006)). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). We view factual evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479, 487 (6th Cir. 2006).
We have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs, the applicable law, and the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Mathews Ford. We agree that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because the district court’s decision is well-reasoned, we need not expand on its analysis. Therefore, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to Mathews Ford for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAULO SERGIO MEDINA-ALMAGUER, Defendant-Appellant. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 07-00110—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.
Argued: March 6, 2009
Decided and Filed: March 12, 2009
Before: KEITH, SUTTON and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Paulo Sergio Medina-Almaguer appeals his 27-month sentence for illegal reentry after deportation. At stake is whether the district court properly characterized a 1989 state-court conviction as a “drug trafficking offense” under the sentencing guidelines.
. . .
For these reasons, we vacate the sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing.
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TOMMY G.MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Appellant. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 05-02872—James S. Gwin, District Judge.
Argued: September 17, 2008
Decided and Filed: March 12, 2009
Before: COLE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; MILLS, District Judge.
RICHARD MILLS, District Judge. Tommy G. Morgan was terminated as a managing partner with New York Life.
He brought an age discrimination action under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, R.C. § 4112.
The jury found in his favor.
The jury awarded him $6,000,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages.
New York Life raises several issues on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in denying New York Life’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and abused its discretion in denying New York Life’s motion for a new trial despite its alleged legitimate business justifications for Morgan’s termination; (2) that the district court abused its discretion in admitting statements of alleged age animus that were unrelated to Morgan and were not proximate in time to his termination; (3) that the district court abused its discretion in declining to give New York Life’s proposed jury instruction relating to statements of alleged age animus; and (4) that the district court improperly upheld the punitive damages award because the amount is excessive and does not comport with due process.
For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the district court’s decision to deny New York Life’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements of alleged age animus or in declining to give New York Life’s proposed jury instructions. Thus, we affirm its judgment as to the compensatory damages award.
However, we vacate the punitive damages award and remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter an order of remittitur reducing the award.