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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HOWARD KIRK GIBNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.


Nos. 06-5909/6442

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 04-00047—Avern Cohn, District Judge.
Argued: February 8, 2008
Decided and Filed: March 7, 2008
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, SUTTON, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

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OPINION
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GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Defendant Howard Kirk Gibney appeals his sentence wherein the district court imposed a term of imprisonment of 84 months and a restitution order in the amount of $1,103,358.10. Defendant argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding that Firefighter Carlos Cruz suffered bodily injury sufficient to warrant the imposition of the 84-month mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Gibney further appeals the factual basis and timeliness of the district court’s restitution order. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm defendant’s sentence.


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LARRY D. DAY,
Petitioner,
v.
JAMES MARINE, INC., and DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.


No. 06-4004

On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board.
No. 06-0518.
Argued: November 29, 2007
Decided and Filed: March 7, 2008
Before: ROGERS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.

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OPINION
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SUTTON, Circuit Judge. There is a little more to this dispute than the topic (attorney’s fees) and the amount at stake (less than $15,000) would suggest. Larry Day says that the Benefits Review Board erred in determining that a portion of the fees he incurred in seeking workers’ compensation did not shift to his employer, James Marine, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Because the Board correctly determined that the Act does not allow an employee to collect attorney’s fees incurred before the employer has rejected the employee’s claim, we affirm this aspect of the Board’s decision. But because the Act does allow—and indeed requires—fee shifting from the time the employer rejects the employee’s claim through the employee’s successful prosecution of that claim, we reverse the Board’s contrary ruling on this point.