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SHERRY DELISLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE CO. OF CANADA, Defendant-Appellant. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 06-11761—Lawrence P. Zatkoff, District Judge.
Argued: October 31, 2008
Decided and Filed: March 4, 2009
Before: MARTIN, BATCHELDER, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant Sun Life appeals the district court’s decision that Sun Life’s denial of long-term disability benefits to Plaintiff Sherry DeLisle was arbitrary and capricious. We agree with the district court that Sun Life’s determination did not result from a deliberate and principled reasoning process. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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LUISA MARGARITA DIAZ-ZANATTA, Petitioner, v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General, Respondent. |
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On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A76 428 081.
Argued: December 11, 2008
Decided and Filed: March 4, 2009
Before: KENNEDY, BATCHELDER, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Luisa Margarita Diaz-Zanatta seeks review of the denial of her petition for asylum and withholding of removal. An immigration judge (“IJ”) found that, because Diaz-Zanatta had “assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution” of others, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(B)(2)(a)(i) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(i), while she was a member of Peruvian military intelligence, she was ineligible for these forms of relief. The IJ instead granted Diaz-Zanatta a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed and adopted the IJ’s opinion. Diaz-Zanatta now petitions for review.
The government contends that the meaning of the statutory language “assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution,” as written in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1231, is plain and unambiguous, and, in any event, is controlled by Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), a case involving these terms in a different statute and in the context of the denaturalization of an individual who had been a guard at a Nazi concentration camp. We disagree with the government’s view, and conclude that the legal analysis of these terms when applied to an alien who is accused of having “assisted or participated in persecution” in the context of working for a legitimate arm of a recognized government differs materially from that analysis when applied to an alien who served as a Nazi concentration camp guard. Because we further conclude that in applying the persecution bar to Diaz-Zanatta, the IJ erred as a matter of law by failing to conduct the appropriate analysis and make the necessary findings of fact, we will remand the case for further proceedings.