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ROBERT C. MARKS, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF TENNESSEE and the ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE of the STATE COURTS, Defendants-Appellees. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 06-01208—William J. Haynes, Jr., District Judge.
Submitted: October 29, 2008
Decided and Filed: February 10, 2009
Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Robert Marks appeals a district court order that dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of Rooker-Feldman. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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JAMES H. O’BRYAN, DONALD E. POPPE, and MICHAEL J. TURNER, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. HOLY SEE, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 04-00338—John G. Heyburn II, Chief District Judge.
Argued: March 18, 2008
Decided and Filed: February 10, 2009
Before: MARTIN, GIBBONS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Defendant Holy See appeals the district court’s denial, in part, of its motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Holy See contends that the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because the Holy See is immune from suit as a foreign state pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. Plaintiffs James H. O’Bryan, Donald E. Poppe, and Michael J. Turner (“plaintiffs”) crossappeal the district court’s partial grant of the Holy See’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs claim that the FSIA does not immunize the Holy See from suit on the grounds alleged in their complaint and thus the district court does in fact have subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The United States as intervenor and amicus supports the position of the Holy See with respect to the Holy See’s status as a foreign state and the constitutionality of the FSIA. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
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In re: RALPH WENDELL SWEGAN, Debtor. _____________________________________ BUCKEYE RETIREMENT CO., Appellee, v. RALPH WENDELL SWEGAN, Appellant. |
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On Appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
of the Sixth Circuit.
No. 03-45698—Kay Woods, Bankruptcy Judge.
Argued: January 15, 2009
Decided and Filed: February 10, 2009
Before: MERRITT, ROGERS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. In this case, the bankruptcy court granted debtor Ralph Swegan’s summary judgment motion to discharge his debt to appellee Buckeye Retirement Co. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Swegan seeks review of the BAP’s decision. Because this court lacks appellate jurisdiction, the appeal is dismissed.
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MICHAEL MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Defendant, and THRIFTY RENT-A-CAR SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellant. |
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Filed: February 10, 2009
Before: DAUGHTREY, GILMAN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Services, Inc. (Thrifty) earlier sought to appeal to this court an interlocutory order from a case pending in the Middle District of Florida. We dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff Michael Miller now moves for sanctions in the amount of his fees and costs relating to the dismissed appeal. We grant the motion.