KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. On May 3, 2007, a grand jury issued an indictment alleging that defendant Hawkins had conspired to distribute and had distributed quantities of powder and crack cocaine. At the time of the indictment, Hawkins had two prior felony convictions, one of which was for possession of an unregistered firearm. Hawkins entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and reserving the right to appeal the court's potential classification of him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Prior to sentencing, he filed an objection in which he argued that his conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm was not a “crime of violence” within U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. J.A. at 67. Relying on the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 and rulings from our sister circuits, the district court overruled Hawkins’ objection and applied the career offender enhancement, sentencing Hawkins to two hundred sixty-two (262) months of imprisonment. Hawkins timely appealed the career offender enhancement.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. After eight years of failed negotiations and ignored orders, the United States sued George Rudy Cundiff (who goes by Rudy) and his son, Christopher Seth Cundiff (who goes by Seth), seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties against them for discharging “pollutants” into “waters of the United States” without a permit in violation of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1362. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, imposed injunctive relief in the form of a restoration plan for the Cundiffs’ wetlands, and imposed a civil penalty of $225,000. All but $25,000 of that penalty was suspended, however, provided that the Cundiffs implemented the restoration plan. The district court also dismissed the Cundiffs’ array of statutory, common law, and constitutional counterclaims. While the original appeal in this case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its splintered ruling in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), which defined the Act’s jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.” In light of Rapanos, we returned the case to the district court to reconsider whether jurisdiction was proper over the Cundiffs’ wetlands. The district court determined that it was because the Cundiffs’ wetlands were in fact waters of the United States, and the Cundiffs appealed. We affirm the district court on all grounds.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, in-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers that market and sell natural gas to Ohio consumers and one of their Ohio customers, sued Ohio’s Tax Commissioner, Richard Levin. They alleged that Ohio’s tax scheme is discriminatory and thus unconstitutional under either the Commerce Clause or Equal Protection Clause because four local natural gas distribution companies benefit from certain tax exemptions and exclusions that they do not benefit from, despite their similar situations. But the district court granted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that, while the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, did not bar plaintiffs’ claims, general principles of comity and federalism did. This latter conclusion was incorrect, and we therefore reverse and remand.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Stephanie Woods pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering arising out of a mortgage fraud scheme and willful failure to file income tax returns. The district court judge sentenced Woods to 30 months’ imprisonment on the money laundering count (Count One) and 12 months’ imprisonment for the tax counts (Counts Two through Six) to be served concurrently. On appeal, Woods argues that: (1) she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether her plea agreement resulted from coercion or undue influence; and (2) her sentence is unreasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. We reheard this case en banc to resolve a choice-of-law question: Does state law control a federal court’s imposition of sanctions as relief for spoliated evidence? The original panel, constrained by our earlier opinions that applied state law to determine whether spoliation sanctions were available, (see, e.g., Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 641 (6th Cir. 2004); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 804 (6th Cir. 1999); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir. 1988)), affirmed the district court’s denial of sanctions because applicable state law did not provide for sanctions based on third-party spoliation. Adkins v. Wolever, 520 F.3d 585, 587 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985)). We granted rehearing en banc to bring our case law in line with other courts of appeals. We now recognize—as does every other federal court of appeals to have addressed the question—that a federal court’s inherent powers include broad discretion to craft proper sanctions for spoliated evidence.

To the extent that our earlier opinions held otherwise, we overrule them. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for consideration of what, if any, spoliation sanctions are appropriate in this case. If the district court determines that sanctions are warranted under federal law, it must also decide whether the earlier denial of spoliation sanctions is ground for granting Adkins a new trial or was instead harmless error. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61.

BOGGS, Chief Judge. Defendants Jon Rutherford and Judith Bugaiski were charged with numerous tax violations and conspiracy to defraud investigators from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The United States appeals the district court’s suppression of certain statements and documents obtained pursuant to an allegedly improper civil investigation. The IRS civil examiners who interviewed Rutherford and Bugaiski were required under an IRS manual to suspend their investigation when a “firm indication of fraud on the part of the taxpayer[s]” surfaced and refer the case to the criminal division. Internal Revenue Manual § 4565.21(1). Despite the fact such indications had emerged, civil examiners continued their investigation, conducting further interviews with the defendants and requesting additional documents.

In the criminal proceedings that followed, the IRS sought admission of their incriminating statements. The district court held the statements had to be suppressed, initially citing United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that any continuation of discussions under a civil audit after firm indications of fraud have emerged would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ; JA 81. At a later hearing, the court narrowed its explanation orally, remarking that not every “violation of the [IRS] manual [creates] a per se constitutional violation,” but that this case did establish a violation. The United States now appeals, contending that the district court misread the Sixth Circuit’s precedent and that the defendants’ statements were improperly suppressed.

Because the defendants’ constitutional rights were not violated by the IRS’s negligent violation of its manual, we reverse the district court. Despite the district court’s reliance on McKee, in that case the Sixth Circuit explicitly reserved the issue now before us. Whether the government violates a person’s due process rights in the course of taking his statement is assessed under a voluntariness standard, and the Constitution does not demand a bright-line rule whereby every breach of federal administrative policy also violates the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Amendment is implicated only when a federal agent’s conduct actually compels a person to speak against his will. With respect to Rutherford and Bugaiski, there is no credible basis for concluding that their statements were coerced. Although the civil examiners may have been negligent in failing to refer the case to the IRS’s Criminal Division, the district court found no evidence that they deliberately disregarded the manual in order to mislead the defendants. Nor is there evidence in the record that suggests Rutherford and Bugaiski were familiar with the manual, or that they were lulled into a false sense of security about the nature of the charges they might face. In short, their statements were given voluntarily and may be properly admitted into evidence without infringing upon their constitutional rights.