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GEOFFREY NELS FIEGER and RICHARD L. STEINBERG, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT; CLIFFORD W. TAYLOR; MAURA D. CORRIGAN; ROBERT P. YOUNG, JR.; and STEPHEN J. MARKMAN, Defendants-Appellants, MICHAEL F. CAVANAUGH; ELIZABETH A. WEAVER; and MARILYN KELLY, Defendants. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 06-11684—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.
Argued: October 23, 2008
Decided and Filed: January 20, 2009
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MERRITT and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. After a panel of judges on the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a $15 million judgment initially entered in favor of his client, and while the case was pending before the court, attorney Geoffrey Nels Fieger made vulgar comments about the judges on a radio show he hosted. The Michigan Attorney Grievance Administrator charged Fieger with violating Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 3.5(c) and 6.5(a), the “courtesy and civility” provisions. Pursuant to a settlement, Fieger stipulated to a disciplinary reprimand while reserving his rights to challenge the applicability and constitutionality of the rules. Thereafter, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the violations and the constitutionality of the rules as applied to Fieger. Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 2006).
In the present case, Fieger and co-plaintiff Richard Steinberg, Fieger’s attorney, challenge the constitutionality of the disciplinary rules on facial grounds. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the courtesy and civility provisions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the rules are overly broad and vague and enjoined their enforcement.
We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We hold that Fieger and Steinberg lack standing because they have failed to demonstrate actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm based on a single, stipulated reprimand; they have not articulated, with any degree of specificity, their intended speech and conduct; and they have not sufficiently established a threat of future sanction under the narrow construction of the challenged provisions applied by the Michigan Supreme Court. For these same reasons, we also hold that the district court abused its discretion in entering declaratory relief.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRELL R. BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington.
No. 05-00038—David L. Bunning, District Judge.
Argued: September 18, 2007
Decided and Filed: January 20, 2009
Before: MOORE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; TARNOW, District Judge.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Terrell R. Bailey (“Bailey”) has submitted a petition for rehearing by the panel or, in the alternative, a petition for rehearing en banc, challenging our prior panel opinion upholding his convictions and sentences for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Bailey, 510 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2007). We grant the petition for rehearing and amend the panel opinion to correct a factual mistake concerning which evidence had been admitted for the jury’s consideration regarding Bailey’s firearm convictions and thus may be reviewed on an insufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. We also amend the opinion to reflect the legal consequences of correcting the prior opinion’s factual mistake.
We adhere to our prior panel opinion, except for the opening paragraph and parts III.B., III.C., IV, and V. We VACATE parts III.B., III.C., IV, and V, and substitute the opinion below for those parts. We adopt by reference the following parts of our prior panel opinion: part I, discussing the factual and procedural background; part II, affirming the district court’s sentencing of Bailey as a career offender; the opening paragraph of part III, setting forth the standard for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge; and part III.A., affirming Bailey’s conviction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In sum, we AFFIRM Bailey’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), REVERSE his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and REVERSE his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.