RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Chavtz Seals, who was injured at work, brought this action asserting a workplace intentional tort claim against defendant General Motors Corporation (GM). The district court granted GM’s motion for summary judgment, finding (1) that this claim was barred by a release plaintiff signed in connection with a voluntary buyout of his employment, and (2) that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his intentional tort claim. Seeking reversal, plaintiff argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the intent of the parties to the general release under the circumstances. On the merits, plaintiff contends that the district court erred in concluding that there was no evidence either that GM had “knowledge” of the allegedly dangerous condition or that GM knew an injury was “substantially certain” to result from that condition. Because we conclude that the release barred plaintiff’s claim, we affirm the judgment in favor of GM.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In this lawsuit involving claims of excessive force, Plaintiff-Appellant George A. Vance (“Vance”) appeals the grant of summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Captain Blaine Wade (“Wade”), Detective Jim Breuer (“Breuer”),1 and the city of Bristol, Tennessee. In June 2000, Vance filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that on June 10, 1999, officers Wade and Breuer used excessive force in handcuffing and securing him during the execution of a search warrant at his business and that the city of Bristol, Tennessee, failed to train and supervise its officers. Vance’s lawsuit also involved state-law claims for false arrest and assault and battery. The case was stayed pending the resolution of criminal proceedings in state court against Vance, and in April 2005 the parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. In July 2007, the magistrate judge issued a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment granting Wade, Breuer, and Bristol’s motions for summary judgment, in particular finding that Wade did not use excessive force in handcuffing Vance and that Wade, although he did use excessive force in shoving and cramming Vance in the backseat of a police vehicle, was entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. In this appeal, Vance focuses his challenge to the judgment primarily as it pertains to Wade. Although we agree that Vance’s allegations are insufficient to support an excessive-force claim for handcuffing, we disagree that Wade is entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim relating to Wade’s actions in placing Vance in the back of a police vehicle. We therefore REVERSE the magistrate judge’s order granting summary judgment on Vance’s claim of excessive force relating to Wade’s actions in shoving Vance inside the police vehicle, AFFIRM the magistrate judge’s order granting summary judgment in all other respects, and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.