KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case involves the dismissal of the claims of Plaintiffs-Appellants Paul Brown, William Fanaly, Charles Thomas, Gary Riggs, Robert Orlikowski, and Scott Way (collectively referred to as “plaintiffs”) against Defendants-Appellees Cassens Transport Company (“Cassens”), Crawford & Company (“Crawford”), and Dr. Saul Margules (collectively referred to as “defendants”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants employed mail and wire fraud in a scheme to deny them worker’s compensation benefits under the Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (“WDCA”), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), 1964(c), and that the defendants’ conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) under Michigan law. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal of their RICO claims based on the reverse preemption of the RICO claims under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012, and for failure to plead certain claims with particularity, for failure to allege a pattern of racketeering activity, and for failure to plead reliance on the defendants’ fraud. A divided panel of this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ RICO claims because plaintiffs had failed to plead detrimental reliance on alleged misrepresentations of defendants. The Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., — U.S. —, 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008), which held unanimously that a civil-RICO plaintiff does not need to show that it detrimentally relied on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations.

On remand, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ RICO claims because the WDCA does not preempt their RICO claims and because plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a pattern of racketeering activity given that reliance is not an element of a civil RICO fraud claim. We REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The plaintiffs also appeal the district court’s dismissal of their IIED claims for failure to plead outrageous conduct. We AFFIRM the dismissal of the IIED claims because the alleged conduct of these defendants could not be deemed outrageous under Michigan law.