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RAYMOND TUCKER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent-Appellant.


No. 07-1408

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 06-10250—Lawrence P. Zatkoff, District Judge.
Argued: June 12, 2008
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2008
Before: KEITH and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; ACKERMAN, District Judge.

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OPINION
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ACKERMAN, District Judge. This case involves the conviction of a man for second-degree home invasion based exclusively upon the testimony of the homeowner, who saw the defendant climbing over the back yard fence and running away from the house. Here, we face the sobering issue of whether a man was unconstitutionally deprived of his liberty. We recognize that such an issue should never be addressed lightly, and so we have endeavored to carefully and thoroughly review, with the appropriate level of deference, the evidence adduced at trial. Having engaged in such review, we conclude that the state court conviction of Raymond Tucker for second-degree home invasion is supported by sufficient evidence, albeit circumstantial. For the following reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s grant of Tucker’s habeas petition.


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TERRANCE BOYKIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PATTI WEBB,
Respondent-Appellee.


No. 06-5775

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Paducah.
No. 05-00153—Thomas B. Russell, District Judge.
Argued: June 10, 2008
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2008
Before: MARTIN and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; JORDAN, Senior District Judge.

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OPINION
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BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Terrance Boykin petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. Boykin sought to overturn his state conviction for complicity to murder and wanton endangerment, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. According to Boykin, because his trial counsel represented both Boykin and his co-defendant Treon McElrath, trial counsel could not pursue facts that would have exculpated Boykin but inculpated McElrath, and thus trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective. Boykin also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal due to the same conflict of interest. We agree with Boykin and find that his right to counsel was violated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and REVERSE the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN KALYMON,
Defendant-Appellant.


No. 07-1965

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
No. 04-60003—Marianne O. Battani, District Judge.
Argued: August 1, 2008
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2008
Before: DAUGHTREY and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge.

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OPINION
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McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. American citizenship is “precious,” and revoking it “can have severe and unsettling consequences.” Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S 490, 505 (1981) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, failure to comply strictly with all of the congressionally imposed citizenship prerequisites, such as lawful entry into the country as a permanent resident, “renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally procured’” and it can be set aside. Id. at 506 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)).

John Kalymon entered the United States after World War II as a permanent resident and later gained citizenship. In 2004, the Government sought to revoke his citizenship, alleging that his activities during the war made him ineligible for entry. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Government proved by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that Kalymon persecuted Jews during the war, advocated or acquiesced in conduct contrary to civilization and human decency, and misrepresented a material fact on his visa application. The district court revoked Kalymon’s citizenship.

On appeal, Kalymon raises several claims of error, including mistaken identity and various evidentiary errors by the district court. For the following reasons, we affirm.


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MARIAMA KOULIBALY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL MUKASEY,
Respondent-Appellee.


No. 07-3743

On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A98 528 129.
Submitted: July 31, 2008
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2008
Before: KENNEDY, GILMAN, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

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OPINION
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JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-appellant Mariama Koulibaly seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order of removal. Koulibaly argues that the BIA erred by: (1) adopting and affirming the Immigration Judge’s finding that Koulibaly was not credible; and (2) denying Koulibaly’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the following reasons, we grant Koulibaly’s petition for review, vacate the judgment of the BIA, and remand for further consideration.


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METRO HYDROELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
METRO PARKS, Serving Summit County,
Defendant-Appellant.


No. 07-3291

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
No. 06-01778—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Argued: February 6, 2008
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2008
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

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OPINION
_________________________

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Metro Parks appeals the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to plaintiff-appellee Metro Hydroelectric Company, LLC. Metro Parks argues that the district court erred in finding that subject matter jurisdiction existed in this case and that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. Because we find that no federal subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case, we reverse the decision of the district court.