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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTIAGO SANTILLANA, a/k/a Chango, Defendant-Appellant. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 02-80302—Julian A. Cook, Jr., District Judge.
Submitted: July 24, 2008
Decided and Filed: August 27, 2008
Before: MOORE and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; ALDRICH, District Judge.
ANN ALDRICH, District Judge. Defendant Santiago Santillana (“Santillana”) appeals a sentence imposed after he pled guilty to two counts of using a firearm during, and in relation to, a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Santillana to 84 months and 156 months to run consecutively, representing a downward departure of 144 months. Although Santillana does not challenge the reasonableness of this sentence, he does challenge the district court’s decision not to make a further downward departure. Because we generally do not review a district court’s decision not to depart downward, and because no exception to that rule applies here, Santillana’s sentence is affirmed.
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216 JAMAICA AVENUE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S & R PLAYHOUSE REALTY CO., Defendant-Appellee. |
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 06-01288—Christopher A. Boyko, District Judge.
Argued: June 12, 2008
Decided and Filed: August 27, 2008
Before: KEITH and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; ACKERMAN, District Judge.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. At stake in this case is the enforceability of a “gold clause” contained in a 1912 lease agreement.
. . .
Either way, in light of this ruling, the parties now know one of the effects of the 1982 assignment. By March 31, 2011, S&R will decide whether it wishes to exercise its option to renew the lease. In the interim, the case needs to be remanded to the district court. Because the court found that the gold clause was not enforceable under the 1933 statute, it did not reach the question of the gold clause’s effect on the rent owed under the lease. Because we conclude that the clause is enforceable, we thus remand the case to the district court to interpret the clause, to determine the obligation it imposes on S&R and to address any other defenses the district court has not yet had an opportunity to address in the first instance, including S&R’s estoppel-by-deed and waiver defenses.
For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.