SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, a group of strip club owners in Ohio, challenged Ohio Liquor Control Commission Rule 52 on First Amendment grounds. Enacted in 2004, Rule 52 provided that an establishment holding a liquor permit may not knowingly or willfully allow nudity or sexual activity on its premises. The district court granted plaintiffs a temporary injunction against enforcement of Rule 52. Later, it declared that parts of Rule 52 were unconstitutionally overbroad and it permanently enjoined their enforcement anywhere in Ohio. Defendants now appeal, arguing that Rule 52 is constitutional. We hold that Rule 52 is not overbroad and we REVERSE.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee Martha Bryant (“Bryant”) prevailed in a jury trial on her claim that Defendant-Appellant Dollar General Corporation (“Dollar General”) fired her in retaliation for her exercise of leave guaranteed by the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Dollar General now appeals, contending that the FMLA does not prohibit retaliation against an employee who takes FMLA leave. Bryant has filed a motion to dismiss Dollar General’s appeal, arguing that we lack jurisdiction because Dollar General failed to file a postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). Prior to oral argument, the AARP requested leave to file a brief amicus curiae in support of Bryant, arguing that federal courts have widely accepted that the FMLA and related federal regulations prohibit retaliation against an employee who takes FMLA leave. We DENY Bryant’s motion to dismiss Dollar General’s appeal, GRANT the AARP’s motion for leave to file a brief amicus curiae, and, because we hold that both the FMLA and its implementing regulations prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who have exercised FMLA leave, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The Detroit International Bridge Company (“DIBC”) and its Michigan-based parent CenTra, Inc. (collectively “CenTra”), believed that more divided them from Windsor, Ontario than united them. For one thing, the Detroit River separates Windsor from Michigan. For another, Windsor and CenTra disagreed as to the future of the Ambassador Bridge, the CenTra-owned bridge that spans the Detroit River; while CenTra sought to add a second span to the bridge, Windsor wanted to stop that expansion. Yet CenTra was wrong in concluding that more divided than united. It turns out that Windsor and CenTra were both employing the same law firm, Gowling Lafleur Henderson, LLP (“Gowlings”): while Windsor hired Gowlings to help the city oppose the second span, CenTra hired Gowlings to help the company raise money to fund the construction of that same span. Although CenTra wanted to expand its connection to Windsor, it was hoping to do so with an additional bridge, not by sharing legal counsel; thus, CenTra sued Gowlings for damages, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and legal malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for Gowlings, holding that CenTra impliedly consented to any conflict of interest in Gowlings’s simultaneous representation of adverse clients regarding the construction of the second span of the Ambassador Bridge. The district court found implied consent because it concluded that CenTra was aware that Gowlings had previously represented parties (including Windsor) directly adverse to CenTra in cases where Gowlings was not representing CenTra. We believe that the district court erred in its granting of summary judgment. CenTra established genuine issues of material fact regarding not only whether it impliedly consented to the conflict of interest, but also whether it could even consent to the conflict in the first instance. Furthermore, the district court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment prior to discovery. We, therefore, REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. A state-court jury convicted Jasubhai Desai of first-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In affirming his conviction, the Michigan court of appeals rejected Desai’s claim that the admission of a hearsay statement of a co-defendant violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth (and Fourteenth) Amendment. In reviewing Desai’s federal habeas application, the district court came to a contrary conclusion and ordered the State to release him from custody or grant him a new trial.

In defending the district court’s decision, Desai does not claim that he is currently being held in custody in violation of the Confrontation Clause, given the twin realities that his co-defendant’s statement was non-testimonial and that the Clause does not apply to non-testimonial statements. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823–26 (2006). He instead makes the following two-pronged attack on his conviction. Prong one: the state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent at the time of his trial and during direct review, because the Confrontation Clause at that time covered non-testimonial statements, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and the state courts misapplied Roberts. Prong two: in accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), Davis should not be applied retroactively to defeat his claim. Because Congress has given us authority to release from custody only inmates who are currently being held in violation of the Constitution, because that is not the case with respect to Desai and because neither AEDPA nor Teague otherwise advances Desai’s application for relief, we reverse.