CLAY, Circuit Judge. Relator SNAPP, Inc. brings this qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., claiming that Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) fraudulently induced the federal government to contract with Ford by inflating, in official reports to the government, the extent of Ford’s dealings with small and minority-owned businesses. The district court dismissed Relator’s complaint for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s requirement that a party alleging fraud “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . .” Because Relator failed to plead with such particularity the nature of Ford’s claim for payment from the federal government, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision dismissing Relator’s First Amended Complaint. However, because the district court did not have the benefit of our decision in United States ex rel Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Bledsoe II”) before denying Relator’s motion to file an amended complaint, we VACATE the district court’s order denying the motion to file an amended complaint and REMAND the matter for consideration in light of Bledsoe II.

VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge. This matter is before the court on Respondents’ motion to supplement the record on appeal and petition for panel rehearing. Upon consideration of the relevant briefs and the record, we grant the motion to supplement the record on appeal, vacate our prior opinion, Wagenknecht v. United States, 509 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2007), and replace it with this amended opinion.

On March 30, 2006, Carl R. Wagenknecht, Jr., (“Wagenknecht”) filed a complaint alleging a wrongful determination and levy on the part of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and seeking a redetermination of the decision. On May 30, 2006, the district court sua sponte dismissed the portion of the complaint challenging the income tax levies for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1)(B), the dismissal included a thirty (30) day period in which Wagenknecht could refile with the Tax Court the dismissed portion of the complaint. In addition, the district court, reaching the merits, sua sponte dismissed the remainder of the Complaint.

Wagenknecht now appeals the district court’s Order. He essentially argues that the district court lacked the authority to sua sponte dismiss his complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will AFFIRM the portion of the dismissal that found there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the income tax challenge and REVERSE the portion of the dismissal which decided Wagenknecht’s claims on the merits.